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Cloud Storage Security Assessment Through Equilibrium Analysis
Yuzhao Wu, Yongqiang Lyu, and Yuanchun Shi
Abstract: With ever greater amounts of data stored in cloud servers, data security and privacy issues have become
increasingly important. Public cloud storage providers are semi-trustworthy because they may not have adequate
security mechanisms to protect user data from being stolen or misused. Therefore, it is crucial for cloud users to
evaluate the security of cloud storage providers. However, existing security assessment methods mainly focus on
external security risks without considering the trustworthiness of cloud providers. In addition, the widely used thirdparty mediators are assumed to be trusted and we are not aware of any work that considers the security of these
mediators. This study fills these gaps by assessing the security of public cloud storage providers and third-party
mediators through equilibrium analysis. More specifically, we conduct evaluations on a series of game models
between public cloud storage providers and users to thoroughly analyze the security of different service scenarios.
Using our proposed security assessment, users can determine the risk of whether their privacy data is likely to
be hacked by the cloud service providers; the cloud service providers can also decide on strategies to make their
services more trustworthy. An experimental study of 32 users verified our method and indicated its potential for real
service improvement.
Key words: cloud storage security; security assessment; equilibrium analysis

1

Introduction

Cloud storage services have been widely used and an
increasing number of end users, organizations, and
enterprises are storing their personal or business data in
the cloud. In perhaps the simplest cloud storage model,
data are uploaded to the cloud, and data consumers
(possibly different from the owner of the data) access
the data through cloud servers. Such a model is very
convenient to realize large-scale, multi-regional, and
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multi-domain data sharing. However, as users’ data
may contain sensitive information related to privacy or
secrets, the third-party cloud storage Service Providers
(SPs) holding large amount of data are becoming the
targets of network attackers and some SPs are becoming
the data abusers themselves. These security and trust
issues are of great importance in the big data era when
data carries great values. It is equally important to
develop security assessment methods to support users to
make good choices on public cloud storage service from
the security stand point and to help service providers to
evaluate the security of their services.
A number of frameworks and schemes have been
proposed for the risk assessment of cloud computing
to evaluate the security of cloud platforms. For
example, the authors in Refs. [1, 2] developed their
own cloud security assessment frameworks based on
risk management assessment methods adopted from
Ref. [3]. Those studies usually treated cloud providers
as defenders of security and assumed them to be
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trustworthy. However, public cloud providers are only
semi-trustworthy, which means they are honest but
curious: they will honestly execute the operation we
call them for, but at the same time may acquire the
content of data. In alternative frameworks, the roles
of the cloud providers are distinguished. According
to Ref. [4], there are two primarily types of cloud
providers: Cloud Service Providers (CSP) or SaaS
or PaaS providers, e.g., Google App Engine, which
offer cloud services over the Internet; and Cloud
Infrastructure Providers (CIP) or IaaS providers, e.g.,
Amazon EC2, which provide cloud infrastructures
(typically virtualized execution environments) as a
service and thus serve as the foundation layer for
cloud systems. The two types of cloud providers
have different security roles and may face conflicts.
According to Ref. [5], a CSP is responsible for nearly all
of the security requirements because in this model both
data access and computation are done on the provider
side, whereas a CIP is generally responsible only for
the availability of resources but not for security. To
the contrary, Wazir et al.[6] pointed out that CSPs face
difficulty in providing security for user data to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, reliability, availability, and
privacy. These studies showed that there usually exist
conflicts of benefits between attackers and defenders,
different layers of cloud providers, as well as cloud
providers and users. These conflicts of benefits affect
the behavior decisions of cloud providers and possibly
render them semi-trustworthy to users, who still lack
adequate assessment mechanisms.
In order to address the semi-trustworthiness of cloud
providers, third-party mediators are often installed
on the access control management frameworks of
cloud storage[7–9] . They may be verifiers for the
cloud providers, or encryption servers managing
cloud users’ private data. There are some Thirdparty Service Providers (TSPs) acting as mediators to
offer security services in current commercial cloudbased applications. Although these TSPs are assumed
trustworthy, they may also face benefit conflicts with
cloud providers and users, which makes them also semitrustworthy, similar to the cloud providers. Security
assessment considering the benefit conflicts related to
TSPs is also lacking.
The most widely-used method to solve benefit
conflicts is game theory. Game theory could be
used naturally as a defensive measure because during
independent and strategic rational decision making,
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each cloud user will compete for their own best
possible solution[10] . Many security evaluation and
risk assessment schemes have been proposed based
on game theory. Manshaei et al.[11] summarized the
game theory approaches towards different topics of
security, mainly including security at the physical
and MAC layers (e.g., jamming and eavesdropping
attacks), security of self-organizing networks (e.g.,
revocation in mobile ad hoc networks), intrusion
detection systems (e.g., collaborative IDS), anonymity
and privacy (e.g., cooperative location privacy),
economics of network security (e.g., interdependent
security), and cryptography (e.g., security in multiparty computation).
From the viewpoint of benefits, the problem of cloud
storage security is not only a technical problem but also
an economic one. The economics of network security
is therefore another active research topic. Researchers
have already investigated dependability and software
economics, behavioral economics, and the psychology
of security for analyzing and solving certain security
and privacy problems[12–14] . Game theory has also been
one of the main tools used to analyze the economics of
security.
In the research into interdependent security, security
can be viewed as a good; everyone benefits when
the network guarantees security and everyone suffers
otherwise[11] . The security of the whole system depends
on the collective behavior of nodes in the network.
According to Refs. [15, 16], in interdependent systems,
each individual’s benefit is determined by the average
security level of the whole system. In these models, an
attacker needs to conquer a majority of the machines in
the network one-by-one to succeed in its attack goal.
The problems in security fields usually involve
decisions among multiple layers, thus game theoretic
models can be constructed on them. The Decision
Makers (DMs) can often be divided into attackers
and defenders, who have contrary benefits. Attackers
attempt to break and interrupt systems and defenders
try to prevent and protect the systems from suffering
damages. Moreover, in cloud computing environment,
there are various types of DMs including users and
different layers of cloud providers. Users and cloud
providers can be defenders as well as attackers,
depending on the benefits. Game theory can offer
mathematic tools and models for DMs to decide their
strategies. One widely used game theoretic model is
the Nash equilibrium. If a strategy profile of a game
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makes each DM cannot individually benefit more from
a change of strategy, this strategy profile is referred
to one of the game’s Nash equilibrium. Along with
its extended forms, it is an effective method to model
security games between attackers and defenders. For
example, Ref. [17] uses the Nash equilibrium to analyze
a Stackelberg competition between one attacker and
multiple defenders, and Ref. [18] uses a generalized
Nash equilibrium to analyze the game between a
CSP and a CIP, pointing out that a CSP can make
a CIP share the security risk by employing certain
strategies. However, these studies do not provide a
clear assessment on cloud security because of a lack of
metrics and evaluation theory.
In this study, we focus on assessing the security
of public cloud storage providers and third-party
mediators through equilibrium analysis. This study
can help both cloud users and service providers to
make better choices and to benefit more from security
investment. The main contributions of our work are as
follows.
— We build multiple game-theoretic models
between cloud users and providers and implement an
equilibrium analysis method on the security games. Our
study covers one-user, multi-user, and multi-service
provider models.
— We analyze several known cloud storage
frameworks using our proposed models to evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages for their security. More
specifically, we have developed a series of theorems and
security guidance for users, CSPs, and TSPs to make
better choices regarding security.
— We conduct a real user study to verify our theory
and methods. The results suggest that our work has
great potential for the security improvement of real
systems.

2
2.1

Related Work
Work on access control management

Many researchers have examined access control
management as a means to improve the security of
traditional database environments. Access control is
applied over the most important problems. Cloud
storage systems, which can be thought of as databases
in the cloud, have also attracted much research attention
to access control management.
Bertino and Ferrari[19] , as well as Gerome and
Dan[20] , tried a key pre-distribution scheme in

untrustworthy storage. This scheme does not have good
scalability and thus cannot support fine-grained access
control. Di Vimercati et al.[21] gave to data a finegrained encryption based on an Access Control List
(ACL), in which a user can only save one key to
derive all the authorities he needs; but this will become
more expensive as the number of users increases. Goyal
et al.[22] first constructed a Key-Policy AttributeBased Encryption (KP-ABE), applying the idea of
identity-based encryption proposed by Shamir[23] to
access control in the cloud. Wang et al.[24] put
forward a hierarchical management of key policy based
on Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CPABE), but the hierarchical management only applied
to storing information on users and attributes. Nabeel
et al.[25–27] constructed, then improved upon a group
key management scheme on broadcast called Access
Control Vector Broadcast Group Key Management
(ACV-BGKM), which uses an access tree to give the
scheme greater advantages. They resolved the policies
to both the owner and the cloud to make it a two-layer
key policy, but a single entity’s power was weakened
and it was prone to collision attacks.
The works above make sure that servers can only
access data which have been encrypted by users, thus
ensuring the inner security of the system. Nevertheless,
the access control management increases the cost of
data exchange, and cannot prevent cloud providers
from decrypting user data. More recent studies have
preferred to perform more encryption and decryption
operations in the cloud and use third-party providers to
deal with security. For example, Li et al.[7] offloaded
most of the key generation related operations to a key
update CSP. Yi et al.[8] considered a scenario where a
cloud user outsourced the task to encrypt and store its
data to several “semi-honest” SPs. These SPs are in
relations of cooperation, as we mentioned in Section 2.3
above. Additionally, Yong et al.[9] suggested a verifier
to check if the SP is actually storing data honestly and
Sharma and Joshi[28] used a third-party “reasone” to
decide what is permitted in an ABE model using Web
Ontology Language (OWL).
These studies have used different kinds of thirdparty mediators for their cloud storage access control
management models, showing that the integrity of CSPs
is in doubt and that they believe TSPs are more secure
than CSPs, even though there is a lack of proof for this
belief.
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2.2

Work on cloud security assessment

Cuschieri[2] proposed a cloud security risk assessment
framework including 11 processes, which is similar to
the work of the Cloud Security Alliance[1] and based on
ISO 31000[3] . The framework can be summarized as
Fig. 1.
Fitó et al.[4] proposed a risk assessment approach
based on Business-Level Objectives (BLO), which
enables a CSP to maximize its profit by transferring
the risks of provisioning its private cloud to third-party
CIPs. Sangroya et al.[29] analyzed the advantages and
disadvantages of cloud computing and surveyed the
security mechanisms of the major cloud platforms,
concluding with a risk assessment scheme to be
employed by CSPs. Kalishi Jr and Pauley[30] and
Theharidou et al.[31] proposed the concept of
Assessment-as-a-Service (AaaS), which suggested
making risk assessment a necessary service of cloud
platforms, but they did not implement the proposal.
From the quantity of work, we can see that the
cloud security problem has attracted enough attention.
However, in the cloud security assessment field, most
of the current work is for helping cloud users assess
their risk before putting their critical data in a security
sensitive cloud. All of this research has laid a solid
foundation for cloud computing, but it has not added up
to a complete risk assessment approach in consideration
of the specific and complex characteristics of cloud
computing environments[32] . These frameworks can
make a reasonable assessment on the risk of the cloud
platform being under attack, but they do not consider
the risk that cloud providers abuse users’ data.

2.3

Work on implementing game theory in cloud
security

Game theory has been widely used in the security
field. As introduced above, Lou and Vorobeychik[17]
and Ardagna et al.[18] analyzed the security games
between attackers and defenders and between CSPs
and CIPs, respectively, to find the Nash equilibrium
or generalized Nash equilibrium. Further, Furuncu
and Sogukpinar[5] not only analyzed the game and
equilibrium between multiple attackers and defenders,
but also established a scalable Risk Assessment Method
for Cloud Computing using game theory (CCRAM).
They used the standards in the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD), in which the impacts of attackers are
divided into Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
(CIA). Based on the goal of the attackers, they divided
attacks into categories such as DoS (Denial of Service),
user (gaining user privilege), data (non-permitted data
access and write), administrative (gaining administrator
user privilege), and scan (getting information about the
target system). CCRAM is an imperfect information
non-cooperative non-zero static game model, which
makes a lot of assumptions. It assumes that among
multiple attackers and defenders, the attacks will
succeed as long as defenders do not defend and fail
as long as some defenders defend. It also assumes
that there is no cooperation between attackers and
defenders, and their behavior will all bring costs such
that it is a non-zero game. Meanwhile they implement
a number of parameters based on these assumptions
to get a mixed Nash equilibrium. Their conclusions
cannot be universalized, but their research methods are
reasonable.
Ismail et al.[33] performed a game theoretical analysis
on the interaction between the verifier and the cloud
provider, in which they formulated the problem
as a two-player non-cooperative game. Reference
[10] presents a review of many possible security
threats and their countermeasures using game-theoretic
approaches.
The majority of works on implementing game theory
in the cloud security field focus on games between
attackers and defenders, or between CSPs and CIPs,
but few focus on the security game between cloud users
and providers. Moreover, the security of TSPs has never
been analyzed.

3
Fig. 1 A cloud security risk assessment framework from
Ref. [1].
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Modeling Cloud Security Games

In order to describe the game between cloud users and
providers, we proceed with our modeling effort in three
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steps. The three models reveal an increasing number
of properties and approaches as the complexity of the
situations grows.
3.1

One-user model

At first, we model the game between one user and
one CSP. In this model, the user makes a decision
between using the cloud service or not, and the CSP
makes decision between stealing the user’s private data
or remaining honest. The utility functions of both sides
only depend on the two DMs and are not affected by
other users on the cloud.
We use Table 1 to present a standard form of the game
between a user i and a CSP c.
If the user i chooses to use the cloud, he will gain
some benefits while paying some fees, but if his data
was to be stolen by the CSP, he would suffer damages.
If the CSP c chooses to steal the user’s data, he could
gain some additional benefits above the fees paid by
the user choosing to use the cloud. But if the CSP’s
theft were discovered, he would suffer damages through
punishment.
Here we state some assumptions behind the game:
(1) If the user chooses to use the cloud, he could
receive profit C equal to the data’s value, while he
would lose the same amount of profit C if his data were
to be stolen. If he then discovered that the CSP was
stealing, he could expose the provider and receive some
compensation Q, where Q 6 C .
(2) If the CSP chooses to steal the user’s data, he
could receive profit C equal to the data’s value and
thus equal to the profits the user could obtain from
using the cloud. If his stealing behavior was discovered
and exposed, he would be punished and pay P , where
Q 6 P . That is to say, he may need to pay a fine on top
of the compensation he would pay to the user.
(3) If the user chooses to use the cloud despite not
trusting the CSP, he could encrypt the data before
putting it in the cloud. The encryption would bring
an encryption cost E to the user and a decryption cost
to the CSP who would like to steal the data. The
decryption cost is positively correlated to the encryption
cost, which can be expressed as F (E).
Set the user i ’s data value to be Ci , the encryption
Table 1

Standard form of the game between user and cloud.
Do not steal users’ data Steal user’s data
Use the cloud
(Bi0 ; Bc0 )
.Bi ; Bc )
Do not use the cloud
(0, 0)
(0, 0)

cost to be Ei , the fees paid to the CSP to be Mi , the
probability that the user finds the CSP stealing to be pf
and the compensation the user could receive if the CSP
is discovered to be stealing to be Qi . When the user i
chooses to use the CSP c and the CSP chooses to steal
the data, the utility function of the user i is
Bi D Ci Ei Mi Ci C pf Qi D pf Qi .Ei C Mi /
(1)
When the user i chooses to use the CSP c and the CSP
chooses not to steal the data, the utility function of the
user i is
Bi0 D Ci Ei Mi D Ci .Ei C Mi /
(2)
Set the CSP c’s decryption cost for user i ’s data to
be F .Ei / , the exposure probability of stealing to be pf
and punishment for exposure to be Pi . When the user i
chooses to use the CSP c and the CSP chooses to steal
the data, the utility function of the CSP c is
Bc D Mi F .Ei / pf Pi C Ci
(3)
When the user i chooses to use the CSP c and the CSP
chooses not to steal the data, the utility function of the
CSP c is
Bc0 D Mi
(4)
When the user i chooses not to use the CSP c, the utility
of both the user i and CSP c is 0.
3.2

Multi-user model

Further, we consider a game model with multiple users
and one CSP. In such a model, the CSP needs to make
decisions on whether to steal the data for each user that
chooses his service and in consideration of his total
profits. For users, although their benefits from using
the cloud are independent, if one user was to find that
the CSP stealing his data, all the users would lose their
trust in the CSP and check whether their own data had
been stolen.
Thus in this model, as long as one user finds the CSP
stealing his data, all of the users whose data was stolen
would discover the theft and call for compensation. In
order to analyze the exposure probability, we set a trust
degree  which is among [0, 1] to represent the degree
of trust that the CSP has with users. Then the exposure
probability pf of the CSP should satisfy the conditions
below:
(1) pf increases as the trust degree  decreases; when
 D 0, pf D 1; when  D 1, pf D 0.
(2) pf increases when the value of the data C that
the CSP has stolen increases. When C D 0, the stolen
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data has no value, and we can consider the CSP faces no
risks or costs, thus pf D 0. When C ! 1, pf D 1.
(3) When  is fixed, the exposure probability when
the CSP steals multiple users’ data is equal to the
exposure probability when the CSP steals a single users’
data the value of which is the same as the total value of
the multiple users’ data.
To satisfy the three conditions above, we can express
the exposure probability pf for a CSP with trust degree
 to steal data whose value is C by the formula below:
pf D 1 C
(5)
We can see that it satisfies conditions (1) and (2)
easily.
For condition (3), we consider two cloud users i and
j , whose data values are Ci and Cj , respectively. We
can obtain the probability that they discover that the
CSP is stealing from pfi D 1 Ci and pfj D 1 Cj ,
respectively. Thus we can compute the probability that
the CSP is exposed by the two users as


pfi;j D1
1 pfi 1 pfj D


1 Œ1
1 Ci Œ 1 Cj  D
1

Ci Cj D 1

Ci CCj

(6)

This probability is equal to the exposure probability
of the CSP with a user whose data value is Ci CCj , thus
we can see the formula satisfies condition (3).
After introducing the trust degree and exposure
probability, we come back to the utility function of the
multi-user model. As with the one-user model, we can
get the utility function of the user i when he chooses to
use the CSP c and the CSP chooses to steal the data as
Bi D pf Qi .Ei C Mi /
(7)
Here pf is the CSP’s exposure probability for all users,
not only the user i .
When the user i chooses to use the CSP c and the
CSP chooses not to steal the data, the utility function of
the user i is
Bi0 D Ci .Ei C Mi /
(8)
The CSP c would make a decision for each user
as to whether to steal their data or not. We use the
steal probability pi to express whether c would steal
user i ’s data. When the CSP chooses to use a pure
strategy, meaning he has just two choices, stealing with
the probability 100% or 0%, we can set pi as 1 and 0.
Thus the utility function of the CSP c on all the users
is
X
X
X
X
Bc D
Mi
pi F .Ei / pf
Pi C
pi Ci
(9)
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Especially, when the CSP chooses not to steal all the
users’ data, 8 p i D 0, the utility is
X
Bc0 D
Mi
(10)
3.3

Multi-SP model

Finally, we consider models in which cloud users can
choose among different service providers.
In these models, a user’s utility function depends on
the service providers he chooses and the other users who
shared the same cloud, thus it is not changed from the
utility function in the multi-user model.
But when taking account of multiple SPs, we need to
consider that they have different kind of relationships.
Basically, we can divide their relationships into three
types: competitive, cooperative, and dependent. In
competitive relations, different SPs maintain their
services and conditions individually. In cooperative
relations, the user employs the resources of multiple SP
in a distributed manner. In dependent relations, some of
the SPs serve only as third-party SPs providing security
services. These TSPs are dependent on other CSPs who
hold the cloud servers. In this relation, users will choose
to either use a CSP’s service directly or to make use of
a TSP to maximize data security.
There are different types of game theory models
for different kinds of relationships. In competitive
and cooperative relations, games are usually among
different SPs. If an SP is disconnected by other SPs or
not chosen by the user, it will not benefit. In dependent
relations, on the other hand, the CSP can benefit
regardless of whether the user chooses the CSP itself
or a TSP who is dependent on the CSP. In this situation,
the game models are more focused on security. We will
make a further analysis of this relation in Section 5.

4

Case Study with One-User Model

Our first result lies in the one-user model and its Nash
equilibrium.
As we have shown above, when user i chooses to use
the cloud and CSP c chooses to steal data, the utility
functions of the i and c are Eqs. (1) and (3); and when
user i chooses to use the cloud and CSP c chooses not
to steal, the utility functions of the i and c are Eqs. (2)
and (4).
When user i chooses not to use the cloud, the utilities
of i and c are both 0.
According to the assumptions in the model, Qi 6 Ci ,
thus we have
Bi D pf Qi .Ei C Mi / 6 Ci .Ei C Mi / D Bi0 :
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That is to say, when the CSP chooses to steal the data,
the profits of the user will decrease.
Theorem 1 In the one-user model, the user must
encrypt his data in a circumstance where there is no
punishment for the CSP when it steals the data, and the
CSP would not steal the user’s data if the decryption
cost is greater than the data’s value.
Proof Because M is the fees that the user paid to
the CSP, it cannot be more than the user’s data value C ,
otherwise Bi0 D Ci .Ei C Mi / 6 Ci Mi 6 0, the
user would not choose the cloud.
When M 6 C , we have
Bc Bc0 DMi F .Ei / pf Pi C Ci Mi D
Ci

pf Pi

F .Ei /

(11)

If the user does not encrypt his data, F .Ei / D 0
meanwhile Pi 6 C i , then Bc Bc0 is not less than 0.
That is to say, when the CSP chooses to steal, he can
ensure his profits are more than from not stealing. If
we do not have an effective punishment mechanism, the
CSP is untrusted. In this situation, the user must encrypt
his data to ensure security.
When Ci 6 F .Ei /, Bc Bc0 6 0, the CSP would
not benefit from changing his strategy to steal. Thus
Theorem 1 is proved.


5

Case Study with Multi-User Model

Here we analyze the model between multiple users and
one CSP.
In the multi-user case, when user i chooses to use the
cloud and CSP c chooses to steal, the utility function of
i is Eq. (7); when user i chose to use the cloud and CSP
c chose not to steal, the utility function of i is Eq. (8).
The utility function of the CSP c is Eq. (9). Especially,
when the CSP chose not to steal all the users’ data,
8 p i D 0, the utility is Eq. (10).
When the CSP chooses to steal user i’s data, his
exposure probability on i is pf D 1 Ci . From
the function’s properties, we can calculate the total
exposure probability of CSP as
P
pf D 1  pi Ci
(12)
Theorem 2 In the multi-user model, even though
some users do not encrypt their data, there remains a
possibility that the CSP would choose not to steal their
data.
Proof Assume that the CSP’s punishment for
stealing is equal to the total fees that all users have paid
to him, which is to say, Pi D Mi . Then

X
X
pi F .Ei / pf
Mi C
pi Ci D
X
X
.1 pf /
Mi C
pi ŒCi F .Ei / D
P
X
X
Mi C
pi ŒCi F .Ei /
(13)
 pi Ci

Bc D

X

Mi

X

Thus
Bc Bc0 D
P
X
X
X
 pi Ci
Mi C
pi ŒCi F .Ei /
Mi D
P
X
X
pi ŒCi F .Ei / .1  pi Ci /
Mi
(14)
Because  6 1, we can get that if Ci 6 F .Ei /,
X
Bc Bc0 6
pi ŒCi F .Ei / 6 0:
That is to say, when the decryption cost for some
users is higher than the data value, the CSP cannot
obtain a benefit from stealing these users’ data.
Therefore, the best strategy for the CSP is not to steal
these particular users’ data.
When Ci > F .Ei / , we assume the CSP would not
steal any users’ data by default, if CSP changed his steal
probability on one single user j to pj , we have
X

Bcj D pj Cj
Mi C pj ŒCj F Ej 
(15)
Comparing to the utility Bc0 when the CSP does not
steal anyone’s data,
X

Bc0 Bcj D .1 pj Cj /
Mi pj ŒCj F Ej  (16)
There exists a minimal K such that when K > Ci
F .Ei /, i.e., F .Ei / > Ci K, we have Bc0 Bcj > 0.
In this situation, the CSP would not steal users’ data.
That is to say, if user i made his data’s decryption
cost to be higher than Ci
K, the CSP would not
steal his data. Also we should notice that if user
i did not encrypt his data, where F .Ei / D 0, then
P
Bc0 Bcj D .1 pj Cj / Mi pj Cj . We can regard
it as a function f .pj / on pj , then f .pj / D 0 is a
transcendental equation with a root pj D 0. According
P
to the value of
Mi and Cj , f .pj / can be positive
in the range (0, 1), also it can be lower than 0 in the
same interval. Therefore, in the multi-user model, even
if some users did not encrypt their data, if there exists
a Nash equilibrium choice for the CSP in which he
would not steal any users’ data, the unencrypted data’s
security can also be ensured. This security comes from
the encryption work of other users.


6

Case Study with Multi-SP Model

Here we analyze a multi-SP model constructed from the
general TSP security platform framework.
A TSP does not own the cloud resources, merely
providing a security service for users who do not trust

Yuzhao Wu et al.: Cloud Storage Security Assessment Through Equilibrium Analysis

the CSP and need more access control abilities for
their data. The relation of TSP to CSP is similar to
the relation of CSP to CIP, where the service of the
former is based on the latter. In the multi-SP model,
users choose between TSP and CSP, where the utility of
TSP is influenced by CSP. Whatever the users choose,
the CSP’s cloud resources are acquired. Therefore, the
utility that CSP can obtain from providing his cloud
storage service is unchanged.
Figure 2 shows a typical TSP framework now in
use. When the user chooses to use the cloud service
directly, he would encrypt the private data himself
and upload it to the cloud, then decrypt the data each
time it was downloaded. When he chooses to use the
service provided by a TSP, he can outsource all of
the encryption and decryption work to the third-party
platform as long as it is trustworthy. In this situation,
the user can gain in terms of usability and convenience
while not sacrificing security.
As a matter of fact, however, the TSP is semitrustworthy just as the CSP is. Users who choose the
TSP should encrypt their data first thus gaining nothing
more in terms of usability through the TSP, but gaining
additional security.
Theorem 3 Choosing a TSP will provide a security
gain over a CSP if the TSP and CSP have the same trust
degree.
Proof Assume that the CSP requires payment Mi
from user i while the TSP requires mi and then puts all
of the users’ data on CSP’s cloud platform, that’s to say,
TSP will pay Mi to CSP for user i’s data. According to
this assumption, we can get m > M , otherwise the TSP
cannot benefit.
Set TSP’s trustiness degree to be TP , we can get its
utility function:
X
X
X
mi C
BTP D
.mi Mi /
pi F .Ei / pf
X
pi Ci D

X
X
X
.1 pf /
mi
pi F .Ei / C
pi Ci
X
Mi D
P
X
X
TP pi Ci
mi C
pi ŒCi F .Ei /
X
Mi D
P
X
X
Mi C
pi ŒCi F .Ei /C
TP pi Ci
P
X
X
.mi M i /
Mi
(17)
TP pi Ci
Especially, when TSP chooses not to steal all the
users ‘data, 8 pi D 0, we have
X
0
D
.mi Mi /
(18)
BTP
Hence,
BTP
TP
.1

Third-party security service platform framework.

0
D
BTP
X
X
Ci
Mi C
pi ŒCi F .Ei /
P
P
X
X
TP Ci /
mi TP Ci
Mi

P

(19)

When TP D ,
0
.BTP BTP
/D
P
X
X
Mi C
pi ŒCi F .Ei /
 Ci
P
P
X
X
Mi D
m i  Ci
.1  Ci /
P
X
.mi Mi / <
.Bc Bc0 / .1  Ci /
.Bc

Bc0 /

(20)

As a result, we can see that when there is an equal
degree of trusts in the TSP and CSP, the TSP would
obtain less profits than the CSP by changing strategy
from not stealing the user data to stealing. Accordingly,
there needs to be a higher value of K to make the
TSP tend to steal users’ data. In this situation, we can
conclude that the TSP is more secure than the CSP for
the users.


7

Experimental Results

In this section, we use an experimental method to test
and verify our models.
7.1

Fig. 2
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Methods

We chose 32 cloud storage individual users as
respondents to a questionnaire survey, of which
16 persons are employees and 16 persons are
undergraduate or graduate students. On the premise that
the survey did not involve much private information,
each respondent answered 7 single choice questions,
including one question to distinguish their identity and 6
questions on their evaluations and preferences regarding
cloud storage and cloud security. The 6 questions were:
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(1) How much value do you think your data in cloud
storage are worth? (2) Do you care about the cloud
provider’s ability to access your data in cloud storage?
(3) Do you put private or confidential data in cloud
storage? (4) Which kind of cloud provider do you
prefer to, a large IT enterprise or a small business?
(5) As an individual user, would you consider a thirdparty secure service provider? (6) Assume that you are
an enterprise user, how would you choose your cloud
security project?
For questions (1) to (4), we did not provide
respondents any additional information so as to make
them select in accordance with their own experiences
and tendencies. For question (5), we provided them
with a TSP offering two secure cloud services: a
“personal edition” at the price of $20/month and a
“professional edition” at the price of $200/month. The
personal edition provides basic data encryption and
security audits while the professional edition offers
functions like web firewalls and remote options to
make their data more secure. For question (6), we
simulated an environment in which the respondent is
an entrepreneur who has decided to use an enterprise
cloud service and is hesitating over choosing which
of two kinds of security product to adopt: the cloud
security service provided by the CSP, or a TSP’s
security product. Each service is priced at $1000/month
and the entrepreneur can benefit by a gross profit
of $5000/month by using the cloud platform. The
respondents could also choose to adpot both or neither
of the two services.
7.2

classified by the respondents’ identity. According to
the results of the questionnaire, 5 persons (15.625%)
thought their data had no value, 8 persons (25%)
thought their data value was in the range $0 – $100, 8
persons (25%) thought their data value was in the range
$ 100 – $1000, 7 persons (21.875%) thought their data
value was in the range $1000 – $10 000 while 4 persons
(12.5%) thought their data value was over $10 000.
Figure 4 shows the respondents’ attitudes towards
cloud providers obtaining their data in response of
question (2), classified by their selection of their data
value in the cloud. In total, 6 persons (18.75%) did
not care about their data being obtained by the CSP,
2 persons (6.25%) were happy to provide their data
to the CSP in return for better service, 13 persons
(40.625%) expressed concern about their data security
and 11 persons (34.375%) were sufficiently concerned
about data security that they would upload encrypted
data to the cloud.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of how often the
respondents uploaded their private or confidential data

Results

Figure 3 shows the respondents’ evaluations of their
data value in the cloud in response to question (1),

Fig. 4 Respondents’ thoughts on cloud providers obtaining
their data classified by their selection on data value.

Fig. 3 Respondents’ selection for their data value in cloud
storage classified by their identity.

Fig. 5 Did respondents upload private or confidential data
in cloud storage?
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to cloud storage in response to question (3). In total,
21 persons (65.625%) said they would not store private
or confidential data in the cloud, 8 persons (25%) said
they sometimes did this and the remaining 3 persons
(9.275%) said they often did so. For question (4),
22 persons (68.75%) preferred the cloud service of
large enterprise, 2 persons (6.25%) preferred small
businesses, while 8 persons (25%) did not trust any CSP.
For question (5), Fig. 6 shows respondents’ choices
on whether they engage a TSP classified by their data
value in the cloud. In total, 14 persons (43.75%) chose
not to use a TSP’s service, 16 persons (50%) chose
the personal edition, and 2 persons (6.25%) chose the
professional edition.
For question (6), 9 persons (28.125%) chose to use
the CSP’s security service, 13 persons (40.625%) chose
the TSP’s service, 8 persons (25%) used both of them,
and 2 persons (6.25%) chose not to use either.
7.3

Analysis and discussions

According to Fig. 3, we can see that majority (87.5%)
respondents thought their data in cloud storage were
worth less than $10 000. The t test between employee
and student resulted in t =1.121 and p=0.136, one tailed,
showing that users’ identity is not relevant to their data
value in the cloud. We can see that neither employees
nor students often use the cloud to store high-value
data. From Fig. 4, 25% persons did not care about their
data being obtained by the CSP. Among the respondents
who thought their data value in cloud was 0, a majority
(60%) did not care about their data being obtained by
the CSP. Using our one-user model can easily see that
in this situation, users would not lose profits when
their data is stolen, thus they would tend not to mind,
which is consistent with the survey results. Among
the respondents who thought their data value in cloud

Fig. 6 Respondents’ selection on third-party secure service
classified by their selection on data value.
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was $100 – $1000, this percentage decreases to 37.5%.
In other classes of respondents, the people who cared
about the data stealing became a majority. For high
value data, the majority of users think in a mode that
follows our model’s assumption.
We can see from Fig. 5 that a majority of respondents
(65.625%) would not store private or confidential data
in the cloud, which means they were concerned about
the security of outsourced data storage even though
the data value they were storing on the cloud was
not very high, which is consistent with the result of
questions (1) and (2). The t test between employee and
student resulted in t D 1:86 and p D 0:04, one tailed,
showing that users’ identity is relevant to their data
privacy in the cloud. We can see from Fig. 5 that,
compared to students, employees uploaded more private
and confidential data to cloud storage.
A majority of respondents (68.75%) preferred cloud
services from large enterprises, and only 6.25% trusted
small businesses, which suggests that most individual
users equate a CSP’s trust degree with the reputation of
the enterprise.
According to the result of question (5) shown in Fig.
6, most people preferred to use a TSP’s security service.
Moreover, the percentage of people who preferred to
use a TSP increases as their data value increases.
Especially, the respondents whose data were valued
higher than $10 000 all chose to use the TSP. However,
only 2 persons (6.25%) chose the professional edition
product, both of whom held data in the cloud valued
at greater than $1000. This is also consistent with our
model because of the price of the professional edition
service. When data is valued at less than $1000, using
the professional edition with a price of $200/month
would quickly lead to negative profits, thus the users
would never choose it.
For the result of question (6), when the price of
the security service provided by the CSP and the TSP
are equal, most users preferred to use the TSP. This
indicates that a majority of users hold the TSP to be
more secure than the CSP, which can also be confirmed
from the response to question (5). Because in this
situation the cost of using the CSP and the TSP is the
same, we can conclude through our analysis that the
majority thought the TSP’s trust degree to be higher
than the CSP’s. Otherwise, choosing the TSP means
that users pay more without gaining additional security.
Through the analysis of the questionnaire, we can
see our models work for a majority of individual cloud

748

Tsinghua Science and Technology, December 2019, 24(6): 738–749

users and have potential for the security improvement
of real systems. The majority of users did not store
high value data in cloud storage, would not be willing
to pay much for securing their data, and preferred
cloud storage offerings from large enterprises. These
conclusions can be guidance for companies to conduct
their cloud business. Furthermore, for enterprise cloud
users, who are more rational than individual users, our
model provides more quantitative tools for them to
make decision around adopting cloud computing.

8

[7]

[8]

[9]

Conclusion

In this paper, we constructed a series of cloud security
models through game theory to assess the risk of the
cloud service providers stealing users data. The models
we constructed can assess the internal security hazards
in the existing cloud systems and estimate whether a
CSP or a TSP would behave honestly to user data.
When analyzing a game between users and service
providers in a cloud system, if a Nash equilibrium
strategy profile makes each SP who is chosen by a user
would choose not to steal the user’s data according to
his utility function, then the cloud system has theoretic
internal security. A semi-trustworthy TSP will offer
users additional security as long as users trust it at least
as highly as the CSP.
Our experimental results show our model and
conclusion to be practical and to work for the majority
of users who participated in our experiment. We believe
our work has potential in real cloud environments and
can serve as guidance for enterprises and individuals in
providing and making use of cloud services.

[10]

[11]

[12]
[13]
[14]

[15]

[16]

References
[1]

[2]

[3]
[4]

[5]

[6]

A. Reed, C. Rezek, P. Simmonds, eds., Security guidance
for critical areas of focus in cloud computing v3.0, http://
cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance/, 2011.
D. Cuschieri, Cloud encryption and key management
considerations, Tech. report, RHUL–MA–2014–9,
University of London, Royal Holloway, UK, 2014.
International Organization for Standardization, ISO 31000,
Risk Management: Principles and Guidelines. 2009.
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